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ALIENS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW:
RAFFAELLI v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS
1
Paolo Raffaelli, an alien, was denied admission to the California
State Bar despite his graduation from an accredited California law
school and subsequent successful performance on the California bar
examination. The Committee of Bar Examiners' refusal to certify
Raffaelli for admission to the practice of law was based upon section
6060 of the California Business and Professions Code, which provides,
inter alia, that an applicant for admission to the Bar must be a citizen of
the United States.2
Raffaelli is a native-born citizen of Italy who came to the United
States in 1959 on an exchange program. After a short return to Italy,
he reentered the United States in 1961 as a foreign student and was
authorized to remain until he completed his education.8 In June, 1966,
Raffaelli received a bachelor's degree in Industrial Relations and Per-
sonnel Management from San Jose State College. He then entered the
University of Santa Clara School of Law, from which he received a law
degree in June, 1969. The following September he took and passed the
California bar examination and thereafter was employed as a law
clerk.4
By application to the California Supreme Court for an original writ
of mandate, Raffaelli sought to compel the Committee of Bar Examiners
to certify him for admission to the practice of law. He claimed that his
exclusion based solely on his alienage denied him equal protection of
the law,5 since the statutory citizenship requirement discriminated against
1. 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972).
2. The pertinent part of the statute provides:
'To be certified to the Supreme Court for admission and a license to practice
law, a person. . shall:
(a) Be a citizen of the United States.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 6060 (West Supp. 1973).
The Raffaelli court reviewed the history of this citizenship requirement and other
statutory impediments to admission to the bar. It is of interest that for 70 years, from
1861 to 1931, with certain limitations, aliens were eligible to practice law in the State of
California. 7 Cal. 3d at 295, 496 P.2d at 1269, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
3. 7 Cal. 3d at 291, 496 P.2d at 1266, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
4. Id. Raffaelli married a United States citizen following the bar examination, and
was consequently granted permanent resident alien status, making him eligible for
naturalization in September, 1974. Id.
5. Id. at 292, 496 P.2d at 1267, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
NOTES
aliens without promoting any compelling state interest. In reply, the
Committee of Bar Examiners advanced five reasons which it felt justified
the distinction drawn by the law between citizens and aliens: a lawyer
must appreciate the spirit of American institutions; he must take an oath
to support the Constitutions of the United States and California; he must
remain accessible to his clients and subject to the control of the Bar;
the practice of law is a privilege, not a right; and a lawyer is an officer
of the court and hence should be a citizen."
Justice Mosk, writing for a unanimous court,7 carefully refuted each
of these arguments, and concluded:
"The classification within the statutory scheme operates irrationally
without reference to any legitimate state interest except that of favoring
United States citizens over citizens of other countries. This latter ob-
jective does not reflect such a compelling state interest that it would
permit us to sustain this kind of discrimination.
' 8
The court consequently voided subdivision (a) of section 6060 of the
California Business and Professions Code and explicitly overruled Large
v. State Bar,0 a prior California case specifically upholding the citizen-
ship requirement.
Throughout United States history, aliens have been excluded from
various occupations by legislative enactments. Justifications for this
exclusion have traditionally been based on self-serving motivations
which, while slowly being attacked, nevertheless persist. The courts, in
upholding such discriminatory legislation, have frequently rationalized
that aliens are not familiar or sympathetic with the government or with
the social order,10 or that the states, through their police power, may
6. Id. at 296-301, 496 P.2d at 1269-73, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 901-05.
7. Justice Tobriner did not participate in the decision of the case.
8. 7 Cal. 3d at 303-04, 496 P.2d at 1275, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 907, quoting Purdy &
Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 585, 456 P.2d 645, 658, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 90
(1969). The decision of the court, however, did not ipso facto admit Raffaelli to the
bar. Within thirty days after the announcement of the decision, the Committee of Bar
Examiners was to determine if Raffaelli were of good moral character, and, if so, he
was then to be certified for admission. 7 Cal. 3d at 305, 496 P.2d at 1275, 101 Cal.
Rptr. at 907; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE AN. § 6060(c) (West Supp. 1973).
9. 218 Cal. 334, 23 P.2d 288 (1933), overruled, 7 Cal. 3d at 302, 496 P.2d at 1273,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The Raffaelli court pointed out:
The opinion in Large, however, merely listed without discussion several of the
traditional grounds for exclusion hereinabove shown to be without merit, and relied
in particular on a North Carolina case decided in 1824-i.e., 44 years before the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 Cal. 3d at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273,
101 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Large v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 334, 335, 23 P.2d 288 (1933); cf. People
v. Cannizzarro, 138 Cal. App. 28, 31 P.2d 1066 (1934).
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prohibit employment of aliens in occupations of an antisocial nature."
Such rationales have been used to restrict aliens from selling intoxicating
liquors,' 2 hawking and peddling,'3 and engaging in numerous other
occupational endeavors.' 4
Courts have also frequently adopted a "proprietary" theory as the
most persuasive justification for the exclusion of aliens.' 5 This theory,
based on the common law doctrine that a state holds property in trust for
its citizens, is invoked to establish that aliens do not stand in the same
relationship to state property and the right to employment or licensing as
do citizens.' 6
It has been suggested that the majority of legislative restrictions re-
sulted from pressure brought to bear on the legislature by those already
in the occupation or profession to prevent competition by aliens. 17 But
with other, more acceptable, rationalizations at hand, competition was
usually not asserted as a justification by the courts. However, in The
Chinese Exclusion Case,' upholding an act of Congress excluding
Chinese laborers from the United States, the United States Supreme
Court was forthright in dealing with the problem of competition, which
the Court expressly referred to as the motivation behind the legislation:
These laborers readily secured employment, and, as domestic servants,
and in various kinds of out-door work, proved to be exceedingly useful.
For some years little opposition was made to them. . . . The com-
petition steadily increased as the laborers came in crowds. . . . The
competition between them and our people was . . . in their favor.'9
11. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (aliens re-
stricted from opening pool halls).
12. Tokaji v. State Bd. of Equalization, 20 Cal. App. 2d 612, 67 P.2d 1082 (1937).
13. Commonwealth v. Hana, 81 N.E. 149, 150-51 (Mass. 1907) (dictum).
14. Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 117 A. 359 (R.I. 1922) (serving as bus drivers); see
Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 CoLUM. L. Rnv.
1012, 1921-22 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Right to Work].
15. Cf. Pastone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1914); McCready v. Vir-
ginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
16. However, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), casts doubt upon the
validity of the proprietary rationale. See text accompanying notes 90-91 infra.
17. Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. Cm. L. Rav. 547, 566 (1953).
18. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). The appeal considered
the validity of the Act of Congress of October 1, 1888, prohibiting Chinese laborers,
who had departed before its passage with certificates granting them permission to re-
turn, from reentering the United States. The Act was challenged as violative of a
United States-China treaty and of rights vested in the Chinese laborers under laws of
Congress. Id. at 589.
19. Id. at 594-95. One author has suggested that the legislative pressures behind
these restrictions were not benignly motivated.
Anyone acquainted with the way our legislatures operate knows that [acts barring
aliens from various occupations] are not sponsored by public-spirited persons or
[Vol. 6
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Another case recognizing prevention of competition as the dominant
motivation is Sei Fujii v. State,2" wherein the California Alien Land
Law21 was attacked and found violative of both the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Attorney
General had asserted the purpose of the law to be to "restrict the use and
ownership of land to persons who are loyal and have an interest in the
welfare of the state."22  However, the California Supreme Court con-
fronted the issue of competition directly, noting:
"[The] primary purpose is to prohibit Orientals who cannot become
American citizens from controlling our rich agricultural lands . . .
[C]ontrol of these rich lands means in time control of the products and
control of the markets."
'2 3
As early as 1885, challenges against discriminatory legislation were
being asserted based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,25 the city and county of San
Francisco had adopted an ordinance requiring a license to operate a
public laundry in a wooden building. While the ordinance appeared
on its face to be a valid exercise of the police power, it was applied
arbitrarily to deny the Chinese, and only the Chinese, consent to oper-
ate their laundries.2 6  Ruling against such discriminatory enforcement
of the ordinance, the Supreme Court noted:
groups, or by persons interested not in furthering their selfish aims but only in
the public welfare; such acts are not sponsored by consumer-interest groups; they
are offered and "pressured" by the organized business, profession, or calling
.... Such laws are directed to the elimination of competition from aliens quali-
fied to engage in the callings. M. KoNvrrz, THE ALiEN AND THE AsTrnc IN
AMERiCAN LAW 172 (1946) [hereinafter cited as KoNvrrz].
Such legislation indicates that the group sponsoring it has power at the polls, while
aliens, who do not enjoy suffrage, lack effective impress on lawmaking bodies. Right
to Work, supra note 14, at 1013.
20. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
21. This law provided, inter alia, that aliens ineligible for citizenship could own and
deal in real property only to the extent authorized by a treaty between the United
States and the alien's nation, and that any property acquired in violation of the re-
quirement should escheat to the State of California. Alien Land Law, 1 CAL. GEN.
LAws ANN. act 261, §§ 2, 7 (Deering 1920), as amended, ch. 1129, [1945] Cal. Stat.
2164.
22. 38 Cal. 2d at 732, 242 P.2d at 627.
23. Id. at 735, 242 P.2d at 628, quoting from the argument presented in favor of
adoption of the Alien Land Law in the 1920 voters pamphlet.
24. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356 (1886); Soon Ring v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885); Barbier v. Connolly,
113 U.S. 27 (1885); In re Sam Kee, 31 F. 680 (1887); The Stockton Laundry Case, 26
F. 611 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886); In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471 (C.C.D. Cal.), rev'd, 118 U.S.
356 (1886).
25. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
26. Id. at 366-67,
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[IThe facts shown establish an administration directed so exclusively
against a particular class of persons as to warrant and require the con-
clusion, that, [the ordinances] are applied by the public authorities...
with a mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical de-
nial by the State of that equal protection of the laws which is secured
. . . by the broad and benign provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2
7
One of the principles enunciated in Yick Wo was that the term "person!'
in the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all persons within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States, aliens as well as citizens.28 Yet
even the Equal Protection Clause does not afford the alien coequal
status with the citizen with respect to all laws of the states. 20  Not only
does an alien have no voting power,30 he acquires no vested right to
remain in the state, since he is subject to expulsion on grounds fixed
by Congress. s1
Justice Mosk, in Raffaelli, referred to section 6060's exclusion of
aliens from the practice of law in California as the "lingering vestige of
a xenophobic attitude" which should join similar "anachronistic classifi-
cations among the crumbled pedestals of history."' 2  Yet, notwith-
standing the forthrightness of this assertion, it is questionable if fear of
foreigners is but a "lingering vestige," since California, after the Raf-
faelli decision, is one of only a few states now permitting aliens to prac-
tice law,33 and since almost all states have restrictions on various other
occupations.
3 4
The Raffaelli court observed that attacks upon the constitutionality
of statutory classifications which are alleged to be violative of the Equal
Protection Clause are subjected to two generally accepted standards of
27. Id. at 373.
28. Id. at 369. The Raffaelli court reemphasized this basic constitutional doctrine.
7 Cal. 3d at 292, 496 P.2d at 1267, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 899, quoting Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
29. C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 1.31 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as GORDON & ROSENFIELD].
30. CAL. CONsI. art. H, § 1; see Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 580,
456 P.2d 645, 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1969).
31. See GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 29, § 1.32.
32. 7 Cal. 3d at 291, 496 P.2d at 1266, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
33. The only states other than California in which it is possible for an alien to
practice law are: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware and South Carolina. In the remainder
of the states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands,
United States citizenship is required. RULES FOR ADMaSSION TO THE BAR IN THB
UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES (West 1972).
34. See Right to Work, supra note 14, at 1012 n.3, which cites numerous statutes
imposing restrictions on aliens' occupational opportunities.
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review. 35 The traditional standard requires only that the use of a state
statutory classification be rationally related to the furtherance of a legiti-
mate state interest. 36  Courts must "reach and determine the question
whether the classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose.13 7  Generally, in the business and economic areas, the courts
have entertained a presumption of constitutionality38 and have deferred
to the legislatures on questions of equal protection." However, other
statutory measures are subjected to greater scrutiny by the courts be-
cause they concern classifications which have justifiably been denomi-
nated as "suspect." 40  Distinctions based on race41 or alienage, 42 for
example, are considered inherently suspect. 43  Measures which include
35. 7 Cal. 3d at 292, 496 P.2d at 1267, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
36. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); F.S. Royster Guano Co.
v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
37. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
38. See, e.g., Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 251 (1936),
wherein a New York statute, which had discriminated between milk dealers who had
well advertised trade names and those who did not by allowing the later to sell bottled
milk in New York City at a price one cent less per quart, was found not to violate the
Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that a dealer of the former class who failed
to show loss of trade or substantial loss did not prove violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. In Hollywood Turf Club v. Daugherty, 36 Cal. 2d 352, 224 P.2d 359 (1950),
the California Supreme Court upheld detailed legislation regulating horse racing where
wagering was involved. See County of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal.
2d 378, 196 P.2d 773 (1948). Contra, Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266
(1936), where a state statute discriminated between milk dealers without well adver-
tised trade names who were in business before a certain date and those who entered
business after that date by granting to the former the privilege of selling milk at a
lesser price. The Court ruled that the discrimination was arbitrary and unreasonable
and in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
39. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The legitimacy of the state's
purpose is rarely questioned and,
[s]ince the process of attributing purpose in equal protection decisions depends
heavily on inferences from the statutory provisions and since the classification is
itself one of the determinant provisions, the inferred purpose will in large measure
be a reflection of the classification. Consequently, the relation between the two
is likely to be clear. Thus, when the purpose of a differential tax law is inferred
to be encouragement of one industry but not another, the classification's relevance
to purpose will be indisputable. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1065, 1087 (1969) (emphasis added).
40. 7 Cal. 3d at 292, 496 P.2d at 1267, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 899; Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
41. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
191-92 (1964); Bowling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
42. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). In
Oyama the Supreme Court indicated that "the State has discriminated against Fred
Oyama; the discrimination is based solely on his parents' country of origin; and there
is absent the compelling justification which would be needed to sustain discrimination of
that nature." 332 U.S. at 640.
43. In Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971),
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such classifications may be justified only by a compelling state interest, 44
and the distinctions drawn must be necessary to further the state pur-
pose.
45
While the Raffaelli court recognized that "'[a] State can require high
standards of qualifications, such as good moral character or proficiency
in its law,'" it quickly pointed out that "'any qualification must have
a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice
law.' 46 In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily on the reason-
ing of Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State,47 wherein a contractor brought suit
to recover a fine assessed for violating California Labor Code section
1850,"s which made it illegal, except under extraordinary circumstances,
to employ aliens on a public works project. Justice Tobriner's opinion,
holding the Labor Code section unconstitutional as violative of the Equal
wherein the financing scheme of California schools was found to be unconstitutional
due to disparities among individual school districts in the amount of revenue available
per pupil, the court found that the educational grants invidiously discriminated against
the poor. The court rejected the thesis that classification by wealth is constitutional as
long as the wealth is that of the district and not of the individual, and, finding wealth
to be a suspect classification, invalidated the system of financing. Although the vitality
of equal protection arguments based on wealth has recently been restricted by the
United States Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), dissents were
registered by some, including Justice Marshall, who felt wealth (or poverty) to be "a
suspect classification which demands exacting judicial scrutiny." Id. at 145; see Notes,
5 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 162, 174-75, 368, 380 (1972). The United States Supreme Court
refused to adopt the Serrano rationale in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973).
44. 7 Cal. 3d at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905; see, e.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
45. 7 Cal. 3d at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905. Justice Marshall, in
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972), clearly articulated the dual nature of this
test. The words "compelling" and "necessary" emphasize that the test is essentially a
question of degree; "that a heavy burden of justification is on the State, and that the
statute will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose" (id. at 343); and,
once a state has shown that a particular statute furthers its interest, "if there are other,
reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally pro-
tected activity, a state may not choose the way of greater interference." Id. There is
no precision in such a test; rather, the test implies a judicial determination of the
emphasis to be placed on the elements of the standard.
In Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969), an action to enjoin enforcement and operation
of Colorado laws imposing residency requirements for voting in Presidential elections,
Justice Marshall expressed the standard in somewhat similar terms:
[O]nce a State has determined that a decision is to be made by popular vote, it may
exclude persons from franchise only upon showing of a compelling interest, and
even then only when the exclusion is the least restrictive method of achieving the
desired purpose. Id. at 52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
46. 7 Cal. 3d at 294, 496 P.2d at 1268, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 900, quoting Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (emphasis by Rajfaelli court).
47. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
48. Ch. 398, [1937] Cal. Stat. 913.
NOTES
Protection Clause, was a straightforward application of the suspect clas-
sification-compelling state interest approach. Invoking the strict stand-
ard of review, the supreme court ruled, inter alla, that the Labor Code
section arbitrarily discriminated against aliens by denying them the
right to an otherwise lawful occupation merely because of their status. 49
The court noted that
the state may not arbitrarily foreclose to any person the right to pursue
an otherwise lawful occupation. Any limitation on the opportunity for
employment impedes the achievement of economic security, which is
essential for the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness. .... 50
Purdy thus held that a state cannot freely prescribe the terms and con-
ditions of public employment in contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, due to the alien's
precarious position in not having voting power (as distinguished from
other groups subjected to discriminatory legislation), the court provided
a special mandate to guard the interests of the alien. 1
Although it was not until Purdy that a statute specifically excluding
aliens from public works projects was abrogated, the death of the
proprietary rationale was presaged in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Com-
mission.52 In that case the United States Supreme Court considered a
statute which prohibited aliens ineligible for citizenship53 from fishing
in California's coastal waters. Conceding that the purpose of such a
law might be conservation of the fish,54 the Court held that a state could
not constitutionally base the exclusion of any or all of its residents from
49. 71 Cal. 2d at 585, 456 P.2d at 658, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
50. Id. at 579-80, 456 P.2d at 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 86, quoted in Raffaelli, 7 Cal.
3d at 293, 496 P.2d at 1267, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
51. 71 Cal. 2d at 579-80, 456 P.2d at 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 86. The court noted:
[P]articular alien groups and aliens in general have suffered from such prejudice.
Even without such prejudice, aliens in California, denied the right to vote, lack
the most basic means of defending themselves in the political process. Under such
circumstances, courts should approach discriminatory legislation with special solici-
tude. Id. (footnotes omitted).
The utilization of this stricter standard of review accounts for the variance of the
Purdy holding from two early twentieth century cases, Crane v. New York, 239 U.S.
195 (1915), and Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), which were factually similar
to Purdy. In both Crane and Heim the United States Supreme Court upheld the
statutes excluding aliens from public works projects. The Court relied on the ra-
tionale that the state, as guardian and trustee for its people, and having control of its
affairs, could prescribe the conditions upon which it would permit work to be done,
and that the law, being of public character, did not infringe upon the liberty of anyone.
52. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
53. The Supreme Court refused to limit its holding to aliens ineligible for citizenship
and applied it to all aliens. Id. at 418, 421.
54. Perhaps here, again, the competitive anxiety may have been the more com-
pelling reason. See notes 17-23 supra and accompanying text.
19731
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
employment as offshore fishermen upon a state claim to ownership of the
fish. The Court was unable to find that the "special public interest,"
upon which the state had relied, provided support for the ban on commer-
cial fishing by aliens.55
The Purdy court articulated three crucial concepts which had been
generally discussed in Takahashi. First, the court would apply a strict
standard of review to all state laws which classify persons on the basis
of alienage; second, the court would reject the state's proprietary interest
in its resources as a justification for discrimination against a particular
class; and third, employment in a particular occupation is a significant,
if not fundamental, interest.56
The first concept relates to the procedural question of burden of
proof which is of paramount importance in the ultimate determination of
the validity of the legislative distinction in question. In viewing classifi-
cations under the traditional standard, the presumption of constitution-
ality is invoked,5" and the burden of proof is upon the party challenging
the classification. 8 However, when a challenge is made to a state
statute which creates a "suspect" classification, contravenes a specific
prohibition of the Constitution or infringes a fundamental right, the
burden is cast upon the state to show that the law serves to promote a
compelling state interest.59 In the latter instance, there is said to be a
"narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality."50
55. 334 U.S. at 420. The "special public interest" refers to the state's claim that
its citizens were the "collective owners of fish swimming in the three-mile belt." Id.
56. 71 Cal. 2d at 584-85, 456 P.2d at 657, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 89; see 334 U.S. at 420.
57. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); County
of Los Angeles v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378, 196 P.2d 773 (1948). See
note 38 supra.
58. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), wherein the Court ruled
that a state statute which prohibited the sale of certain retail goods on Sundays (Sunday
Closing Law or Sunday Blue Law) did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court pointed out:
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it. Id. at 425-26 (emphasis added).
The Court declared that the record was barren of any indication that a reasonable
basis did not exist. Id. at 426. While it was alleged that the statute violated the con-
stitutional guarantee of freedom of religion, the plaintiffs had alleged only economic
injury. Id. at 429. See note 38 supra. They had not alleged any infringement of
their own religious freedom. Presumably, if the latter had been proven, a greater
showing of state interest-a compelling interest-would have been needed to justify the
statute since a fundamental constitutional right would have been directly endangered.
59. 7 Cal. 3d at 295, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 901, 496 P.2d at 1269; Purdy & Fitzpatrick
v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 579, 456 P.2d 645, 654, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 86 (1969).
60. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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As a result of imposition of the strict standard, coupled with the state's
procedural burden, it would appear the courts have, in fact, created a
presumption of unconstitutionality.
The rule that the state must bear the burden of asserting a compelling
state interest in cases involving unequal treatment of aliens certainly
seems well founded. The danger of infringement of constitutional rights
is substantial and the alien would find it extremely difficult to establish
the lack of a legitimate state interest if the burden were shifted to him:
"If alien discriminations are permitted to stand unless the alien can
prove factually that the legislature was unreasonable, then in many
cases he must give up the task for it is frequently impossible to submit
facts which would establish the negative proposition that there is a com-
plete absence of relationship between the exclusion of the alien and the
public welfare." ' -1
The State, in Raffaelli, presented several propositions in attempting to
fulfill its burden of establishing a compelling interest in requiring United
States citizenship as a prerequisite for admission to the Bar. The court
analyzed and rejected each of these propositions, finding them insuf-
ficient to support the statutory requirement.
First, the State claimed that a lawyer must appreciate the spirit of
American institutions."' The court recognized that, to the extent this
interest implies a basis of exclusion for unpopular convictions, it could
not be supported. 3 Notwithstanding an applicant's particular beliefs
concerning American institutions, the First Amendment "'prohibits a
State from excluding a person from a profession or punishing him solely
because he is a member of a particular political organization or because
he holds certain beliefs.' ",64 In Baird v. State Bar, 65 an Arizona Bar ap-
plicant had refused to answer a question as to whether she had ever been
a member of the Communist Party, and the Bar Committee refused to
process her application. The United States Supreme Court ruled that
the First Amendment protects an applicant for admission to the practice
61. KoNvrrz, supra note 19, at 181, quoting O'Connor, Constitutional Protection of
the Alien's Right to Work, 18 N.Y.U.L.Q. 483, 493 (1941). For example, suppose
the legislature excluded redheaded men from employment as taxi drivers. Such a man
would find it difficult to prove that the statute directed against his class was unrea-
sonable. "About all he could say is that everybody knows that red headed men drive
as well as other people." KoNvrrz, supra note 19, at 181.
62. 7 Cal. 3d at 296, 496 P.2d at 1269, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
63. Id.
64. Id., quoting Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971); accord, Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957); cf. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
65. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
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of law from "being subjected to a question potentially so hazardous to
her liberty." 66 While prior acts could, under certain circumstances, be
a subject of inquiry, "views and beliefs are immune from bar association
inquisitions designed to lay a foundation for barring an applicant from
the practice of law."'
67
It would appear more likely, however, that the assertion by the State
in Raffaelli related to a general understanding of the theory and practice
of the American government and social system. The court recognized
that this was a legitimate state interest,' 8 but noted there was no showing
that the exclusion of aliens promoted that interest:
Nor has it been established that aliens as a class are incapable of pos-
sessing such understanding. Knowledge of this kind is acquired in
many ways, both formal and informal. It comes not so much from the
accident of birth as from the experience of the daily life of the com-
munity and the role of government in that life. . . . [T]here is no
prescribed minimum number of years that a person must reside in the
United States in order thus to "appreciate" our institutions.09
Raffaelli, himself, the court pointed out, had demonstrated his apprecia-
tion of the spirit of American institutions by settling in California, marry-
ing an American girl and completing his undergraduate and legal educa-
tion in California schools. °
As its second claim, the State asserted that a lawyer must take an oath
to support the Constitution of the United States and California. 71 The
court, relying on its previous First Amendment discussion, noted initially
that to inquire into the "loyalty" of a prospective lawyer would be to
"skate on very thin constitutional ice.' 72 In addition, citing federal laws
under which resident aliens may be conscripted into the armed forces of
the United States73 and be required to take a loyalty oath, ' 4 Justice Mosk
pointed out that aliens as a class are not incapable of honestly subscribing
to the oath in question.75 The court's argument may be weakened by the
dangers inherent in the conscription of aliens who may find themselves
66. Id. at 5. The Court ruled that the extensive personal and professional informa-
tion supplied would provide the state with adequate means to protect its legitimate
interest of ascertaining the applicant's qualities or character.
67. Id. at 8; see In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 30 (1971).
68. 7 Cal. 3d at 296, 496 P.2d at 1269, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 297, 496 P.2d at 1270, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 50 U.S.C. APP. § 454 (1970).
74. 10 U.S.C. § 502 (1970).
75. 7 Cal. 3d at 297, 496 P.2d at 1270, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
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with military commitments to another country.76 Yet the reliance on
the First Amendment seems to minimize this weakness.
77
Additional support for the court's argument is found in at least two
criminal cases which indicate the California courts have recognized
that aliens may be just as loyal and committed to the laws as citizens .7
And in Sei Fujii v. State7 9 the court stated that "ineligibility [to citizen-
ship] does not establish a lack of loyalty or the absence of interest in the
welfare of the country."'  The court also noted that an alien whose
American-born children are citizens and who has been in the country
for any period of time, paying taxes, serving in the armed forces and
contributing generally to the welfare of the country, would have a funda-
mental interest in being loyal to the country."'
Thirdly, the State contended that a lawyer must remain accessible to
his clients and subject to the control of the State Bar.82 The court
pointed out the inconsistency of arguing that aliens as a class would be
inclined to return to their native country and thus become inaccessible,
since in our mobile society citizens would be no less likely to move to
another jurisdiction.88 The court also noted that the possibility that an
alien would be involuntary deported or interned should a war break out
is mitigated by the unforeseeability of such an occurrence, as well as by
76. Among the foremost [dangers] is the possible imposition of dual (or even
multiple) military obligations on the national who has lived abroad ...
The importance of these problems and many others that can arise, should not
be minimized. Stamberg, International Law and the Conscription of Aliens, 27
Ar.3 y L. REv. 11, 43 (1963).
77. It would seem that conscripted aliens are generally protected by the same con-
stitutional guarantees as are citizens. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
78. In People v. Lovato, 258 Cal. App. 2d 290, 293-96, 65 Cal. Rptr. 638, 641-43
(1968), the court of appeal stated:
mo categorically hold that every alien who is intentionally in possession of a
concealable weapon, regardless of the reason, is guilty of . . . murder in the
second degree if the offense results in a homicide . . . would manifestly lead to
unjust and even absurd results. Moreover, to in effect state that a person's
citizenship is the controlling factor as to whether a homicide was committed with
malice is not only illogical but would constitute an affront to the judiciary which
through the years has constantly striven to find compelling reasons rather than
arbitrary distinctions before making rules which result in differing treatment of
people. Id. at 293, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 64 (emphasis added).
In People v. Satchell, 6 Cal. 3d 28, 39, 489 P.2d 1361, 1369, 98 Cal. Rptr. 33, 41
(1971), the California Supreme Court cited with approval the reasoning of Lovato
regarding distinctions based on alienage. See People v. Rappard, 28 Cal. App. 3d
302, 104 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1972), holding that a statute prohibiting the ownership or
possession of concealable firearms by aliens was a denial of equal protection of the
law.
79. 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
80. Id. at 733, 242 P.2d at 627.
81. Id.
82. 7 Cal. 3d at 299, 496 P.2d at 1271, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
83. Id., 496 P.2d at 1272, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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the fact that deportation or internment is not an inevitable consequence.8 4
As an example, the court pointed out that during World War 1 German
and Italian nationals were not interned unless suspected of disloyalty to
the United States. 5
The fourth ground urged by the State was that the practice of law is a
privilege, not a right.86  Although many claims for relief have been lost
in the "semantic pitfalls"87 obscuring the discussion of the right-privilege
dichotomy in the past, the continuing constitutional significance of the
distinction has recently been rejected. s8 The right-privilege distinction
was previously utilized to uphold discriminatory classifications based on
citizenship. As Justice Cardozo once indicated:
To disqualify aliens [from public works projects] is discrimination,
indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination; for the principle of exclusion
is the restriction of the resources of the state to the advancement and
profit of the members of the state. . . . The state, in determining
what use shall be made of its own moneys, may legitimately consult the
welfare of its own citizens, rather than that of aliens. Whatever is a
privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship.89
This rationale, however, was destroyed in Graham v. Richardson,0
wherein the United States Supreme Court invalidated, on equal protection
grounds, an Arizona statute which required aliens to satisfy a consider-
able period of residency before they could qualify for welfare assistance,
while there was no such requirement for citizens. The Court expressly
rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
governmental benefit is characterized as a "right" or a "privilege."9 1
The "privilege" label had also been used as one of the bases for sanc-
tioning a citizenship requirement for admission to the bar. 2 However,
84. Id.
85. Id. n.6. However, the court should perhaps have acknowledged the internment
of both Japanese aliens and native-born American citizens of Japanese ancestry during
World War 11. See A. BOSwORTH, AMBmcA's CONCENTRATION CAMPS (1968). Yet,
the court's basic premise remains reasonably valid, namely, that a lawyer's accessibility
to clients would not be reduced simply due to alienage.
86. 7 Cal. 3d at 300, 496 P.2d at 1271-72, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 904-05.
87. Right to Work, supra note 14, at 1020.
88. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). In 1963, the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that unemployment compensation benefits are not a "right"
but a "privilege." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). See also Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
89. People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429-30 (N.Y. 1915).
90. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
91. Id. at 374. The Graham Court also invalidated a Pennsylvania statute requiring
citizenship for benefits.
92. Large v. State Bar, 218 Cal. 334, 23 P.2d 288 (1933); In re Hong Yen Chang,
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the discriminatory utility of the label in this area was gradually eroded.
In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,93 the United States Supreme
Court noted:
Regardless of how the State's grant of permission to engage in this
occupation is characterized [as a right or as a privilege], it is sufficient
to say that a person cannot be prevented from practicing except for
valid reasons. 94
Eleven years later, the California Supreme Court concluded that it was
"impossible. . . to regard admission to the profession as a mere privi-
lege."95 Finally, in 1971, the United States Supreme Court stated that
"[tihe practice of law is not a matter of grace, but of right for one who
is qualified by his learning and his moral character."9
As its final rationale, the State argued that a lawyer is an officer of
the court and, therefore, should be a citizen.17  The Raffaelli court
pointed out, however, that, notwithstanding the lack of a good definition
of the term "officer of the court," it is clear that the California attorney
is not a public office holder.98  In effect the court defined the term in
relation to the previous discussion: an officer of the court should be
able to appreciate the spirit of American institutions, subscribe to an
oath to support the Constitution, remain accessible to his clients and
subject to the control of the bar, and meet similar responsibilities. This
definition, which does not cast the attorney in any official public role,
was a rather convenient way to dispose of a weak argument. It was also
used by the court to distinguish a recent Connecticut case which had
upheld a similar citizenship requirement. 99 The Raffaelli court simply
noted that in Connecticut a member of the bar is "much more than a
lawyer in the usual sense of the word."'
' 0
84 Cal. 163, 24 P. 156 (1890); Templar v. State Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Mich.
1902); In re Admission to Bar, 84 N.W. 611 (Neb. 1900). See generally Annot.,
39 A.L.R. 346, 349 (1925).
93. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
94. Id. at 239 n.5, quoted in 7 Cal. 3d at 300, 496 P.2d at 1271-72, 101 Cal. Rptr.
at 904-05.
95. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 452 n.3, 421 P.2d
76, 80 n.3, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228, 232 n.3 (1966).
96. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 8 (1971), quoted in 7 Cal. 3d at 300, 496
P.2d at 1272, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
97. 7 Cal. 3d at 300-01, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
98. Id. at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
99. In re Griffiths, 294 A.2d 281 (Conn. 1972), rev'd, 41 U.S.L.W. 5143 (1973)
(citing the "thoughtful" Raffaelli opinion).
100. 7 Cal. 3d at 303 n.10, 496 P.2d at 1274 n.10, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.10. A
member of the Connecticut bar "is ipso facto a commissioner of the superior court,
has statutory power to sign writs, issue subpoenas, take recognizances and administer
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The Raffaelli decision apparently rests solely upon equal protection
grounds.' However, several of the cases cited by the court indicate
that legislative restrictions which discriminate against aliens can also be
attacked on the basis that such legislation encroaches upon the federal
government's power to control immigration. 10 2 Since Congress possesses
the exclusive right to regulate immigration and naturalization, 10 3 state
laws which substantially encroach upon the exercise of this power can-
not stand. This theory was first articulated in Truax v. Raich,'"
wherein the United States Supreme Court struck down an Arizona
statute which had restricted the proportion of aliens which could be
employed by any employer to twenty percent. The Court reasoned that
permitting a state to deny lawfully-admitted aliens the opportunity of
earning a livelihood
would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance
and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot
work. And, if such a policy were permissible, the practical result
would be that those lawfully admitted to the country under the author-
ity of acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a substantial sense ...
the privileges conferred by admission, would be segregated in such of
the States as chose to offer hospitality.1
0 5
Most recently, in Graham v. Richardson,0 6 the rationale of Truax
oaths, and is entitled to command sheriffs and constables to issue orders 'by authority
of the State of Connecticut.'" Id.
101. Raffaelli had also contended that the citizenship requirement was invalid as
an encroachment on the judicial power to determine standards for bar admission. The
State, however, argued that the judicial function is limited to imposing requirements
additional to those imposed by the legislature. Without deciding the merits of either
position, the court pointed out that "it is clear that the Legislature is authorized only
to prescribe reasonable restrictions within constitutional parameters on the admission
to practice." Id. at 302 n.9, 496 P.2d at 1274 n.9, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 906 n.9, citing
Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 281 P. 1018 (1929). In Brydonjack, a petition
to the California Supreme Court for certification for admission to the bar, the court
said:
Admission to practice is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be
the exercise of a judicial function. . . . Admissions to practice have also been
held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. But
the power of the legislature to impose reasonable restrictions upon the prac-
tice of the law has been recognized in this state almost from the inception of
statehood. Id. at 443, 281 P. at 1020 (citations omitted).
See also State ex rel. State Bar, 114 N.W.2d 796 (Wis. 1962).
102. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-80 (1971); Purdy &
Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 572-78, 456 P.2d 645, 649-53, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77,
81-85 (1969).
103. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
104. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
105. Id. at 42.
106. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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was again reiterated. In Graham the Court ruled that the Arizona
statutel0r requiring fifteen years of United States residency for aliens to
be eligible for certain assistance programs was unconstitutional. Noting
the existence of a comprehensive federal plan for the regulation of im-
migration and naturalization, the Court reasoned, inter alia, that since
Congress had not imposed any burden or restriction on aliens who
became indigent after their entry into the United States,108 state laws
which restricted eligibility for welfare benefits merely because of alienage
conflicted with overriding national policies.10 9
Similarly, in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State,"x0 an extensive review of
immigration statutes was presented as they relate to aliens who seek to
enter the American labor market. The California Supreme Court noted
that states may deal with matters of special concern which fall within
their traditional legislative competence,"' but concluded that the Labor
Code section excluding aliens from public works projects "frustrates the
accomplishment and execution" of the Immigration and Nationality
Act." 2  Thus, to the extent that the legislative restriction involved in
Raffaelli is likewise an encroachment upon the federal power, the court
could have utilized this theory as well." 3
107. Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 46-233 (1956) provided, in part:
No person shall be entitled to general assistance . . . who does not meet and
maintain the following requirements:
1. Is a citizen of the United States, or has resided in the United States a total
of fifteen years.
108. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(8), (15) (1970) provide that "aliens who are paupers,
professional beggars, or vagrants" or aliens who "are likely at any time to become
public charges" shall be excluded from admission into the United States. But the
Graham Court pointed out:
Congress has not seen fit to impose any burden or restriction on aliens who be-
come indigent after their entry into the United States. Rather, it has broadly
declared: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory . . . to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and this statute has been held to
apply to aliens as well as to citizens. 403 U.S. at 377, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970).
109. 403 U.S. at 377.
110. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 572-78, 456 P.2d 645, 649-53, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 81-85 (1969).
111. Id. at 576, 456 P.2d at 652, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
112. Id. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(14), ch. 477,
66 Stat. 163 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1970), provides that all
immigrants, excepting immediate relatives of United States citizens or of lawfully ad-
mitted resident aliens, who seek to enter the United States for the purpose of per-
forming skilled or unskilled labor shall be excluded unless the Secretary of Labor
certifies that "there are not sufficient workers in the United States who are able,
willing, qualified, and available . . . to perform such skilled or unskilled labor," and
that "the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed." See also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a) (1970).
113, In Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 720, 242 P.2d 617, 619-22 (1952), the
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The Raffaelli court's use of the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate
the citizenship requirement for admission to the State Bar was a unique,
though logical, step. A similar result was reached in Alaska, but the
Alaska court sidestepped the equal protection issue and based its decision
on the ground that the statute was an unreasonable encroachment on
the inherent judicial power to determine standards of admission to the
bar.11
4
In view of the strict judicial scrutiny of suspect classifications, the
supremacy of federal power regarding immigration, and the favorable
procedural standing of an individual attacking one of the suspect classifi-
cations, it is not surprising that some legal writers have claimed that all
legislative restrictions on occupations directed at aliens should be
deemed unconstitutional. 115 Nevertheless, although questions regarding
the constitutionality of the citizenship requirement for the practice of
law were raised soon after World War II,116 many legal writers and
courts were in agreement as to the validity of the restriction." 7  The
decision in Ratfaelli should provide impetus for attacks upon similar
statutes in other states. The decision may also be utilized to support
nullification of various other occupational restrictions based on citizen-
ship in California and elsewhere."' With the support mustered from
decisions of the federal courts annulling on equal protection grounds
residence requirements for admission to the bar," 9 persuasive attacks
court, in addition to an equal protection and supremacy argument, relied on the
United Nations Charter, pledging the member nations to promote the observance of
human rights and fundamental freedoms without distinctions as to race, not as binding
authority but as enlightened support. U.N. CHARTER preamble, arts. 1, 55, 56.
114. Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1971). The Raffaelli court's refer-
ence to this theory of attack is presented in note 101 supra.
115. KoNvrrz, supra note 19.
116. See Comment, The Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. CHi. L. Rv. 547, 569
(1953).
117. See Right to Work, supra note 14, at 1027 nn. 109-10.
118. On authority of the equal protection rationale in Purdy, the California At-
torney General has concluded that citizenship cannot be constitutionally required for
occupations such as teacher, peace officer, pharmacist, psychologist, psychiatric tech-
nician, clinical social worker, private investigator or insurance broker. 7 Cal. 3d at
303, 496 P.2d at 1275, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 907, citing 55 OP. CAL. ArrY GEN. 80
(1972); 53 OP. CAL. A=rT GEN. 63 (1970).
119. Potts v. Supreme Court, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Hawaii 1971) (pre-bar ex-
amination residence requirements based on qualification for voting); Lipman v. Van
Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971) (one year residency requirement prior to
application for admission); Webster v. Wofford, 321 F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(one year residency requirement for admission to the bar when examination already
passed). These and similar cases were referred to by the Raffaelli court. 7 Cal. 3d
at 294, 496 P.2d at 1268, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 900. But cf. Suffling v. Bondurant, 339
F. Supp. 257 (1972), aff'd sub. nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
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on various other restrictions may be mounted. Ultimately, the con-
sequences of striking the citizenship requirements for admission to the
bar of all states could lead to greater liberalization and expansion of
international law practices. As was noted in 1965:
In spite of the present restrictions on the admission of aliens and alien
attorneys to the practice of law in both Japan and the United States,
the very fact that the issue of admission of aliens has been faced is
encouraging. [T]he growing awareness of the need for readily
available legal advice on problems involving foreign law and the devel-
oping civilized maturity in outlook with respect to dealings with peo-
ples of other lands will not encounter the stubborn opposition so
normal to a new idea.120
Perhaps the ultimate goal is best described by a Biblical passage:
And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex
him.
But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one
born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself .... 121
Leonard Siegel
120. Ohira & Stevens, Alien Lawyers in the United States and Japan-A Compara-
tive Study, 39 WASH. L. REv. 412, 435 (1964).
121. Leviticus 19:33-34, quoted in Introduction to KoNvrTz, supra note 19.
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